ARCHIVE // MM // TIME-SERIES
Illicit drugs
Burma (Myanmar) — 36 years of data
Historical Values
| Year | Value |
|---|---|
| 1990 | world's largest illicit producer of opium poppy and minor producer of cannabis for the international drug trade; opium production is on the increase as growers respond to the collapse of Rangoon's antinarcotic programs |
| 1991 | world's largest illicit producer of opium poppy and minor producer of cannabis for the international drug trade; opium production is on the increase as growers respond to the collapse of Rangoon's antinarcotic programs |
| 1992 | world's largest illicit producer of opium poppy and minor producer of cannabis for the international drug trade; opium production is on the increase as growers respond to the collapse of Rangoon's antinarcotic programs |
| 1993 | world's largest illicit producer of opium poppy and minor producer of cannabis for the international drug trade; opium production has nearly doubled since the collapse of Rangoon's antinarcotic programs |
| 1994 | world's largest illicit producer of opium (2,575 metric tons in 1993) and minor producer of cannabis for the international drug trade; opium production has doubled since the collapse of Rangoon's antinarcotic programs |
| 1995 | world's largest illicit producer of opium (2,030 metric tons in 1994 - dropped 21% due to regional drought in 1994) and minor producer of cannabis for the international drug trade; opium production continues to be almost double since the collapse of Rangoon's antinarcotic programs; growing role in amphetamine production for regional consumption |
| 1996 | world's largest illicit producer of opium (2,340 metric tons in 1995) and source for over 60% of US heroin imports; minor producer of cannabis for the international drug trade; Rangoon's antinarcotic programs hindered by lack of resources, government commitment; growing role in methamphetamine production for regional consumption |
| 1997 | world's largest illicit producer of opium (2,560 metric tons in 1996 - a 9% increase over 1995) and a minor producer of cannabis for the international drug trade; surrender of drug warlord KHUN SA's Mong Tai Army in January 1996 was hailed by Rangoon as a major counternarcotics success, but lack of serious government commitment and resources continue to hinder the overall antidrug effort; growing role in the production of methamphetamines for regional consumption BURUNDI |
| 1998 | world's largest illicit producer of opium (cultivation in 1997-155,150 hectares, a 5% decline from 1996; potential production-2,365 metric tons, an 8% drop from 1996) and a minor producer of cannabis for the international drug trade; surrender of drug warlord KHUN SA's Mong Tai Army in January 1996 was hailed by Rangoon as a major counternarcotics success, but lack of serious government commitment and resources continue to hinder the overall antidrug effort; growing role in the production of met |
| 1999 | world's largest producer of illicit opium (cultivation in 1998--130,300 hectares, a 16% decline from 1997; potential production--1,750 metric tons, down 26% due to drought and the first eradication effort since the current government took power in 1987) and a minor producer of cannabis for the international drug trade; surrender of drug warlord KHUN SA's Mong Tai Army in January 1996 was hailed by Rangoon as a major counternarcotics success, but lack of serious government commitment and resource |
| 2000 | world's second largest producer of illicit opium, after Afghanistan (potential production in 1999 - 1,090 metric tons, down 38% due to drought; cultivation in 1999 - 89,500 hectares, a 31% decline from 1998); surrender of drug warlord KHUN SA's Mong Tai Army in January 1996 was hailed by Rangoon as a major counternarcotics success, but lack of government will and ability to take on major narcotrafficking groups and lack of serious commitment against money laundering continues to hinder the overa |
| 2001 | world's second largest producer of illicit opium, after Afghanistan (potential production in 1999 - 1,090 metric tons, down 38% due to drought; cultivation in 1999 - 89,500 hectares, a 31% decline from 1998); surrender of drug warlord KHUN SA's Mong Tai Army in January 1996 was hailed by Rangoon as a major counternarcotics success, but lack of government will and ability to take on major narcotrafficking groups and lack of serious commitment against money laundering continues to hinder the overa |
| 2002 | world's second largest producer of illicit opium (potential production in 2002 - 630 metric tons, down 27% due to drought and, to a lesser extent, eradication; cultivation in 2002 - 77,000 hectares, a 27% decline from 2001); surrender of drug warlord KHUN SA's Mong Tai Army in January 1996 was hailed by Rangoon as a major counternarcotics success, but lack of government will and ability to take on major narcotrafficking groups and lack of serious commitment against money laundering continues to |
| 2003 | world's second largest producer of illicit opium (potential production in 2002 - 630 metric tons, down 27% due to drought and, to a lesser extent, eradication; cultivation in 2002 - 77,000 hectares, a 27% decline from 2001); surrender of drug warlord KHUN SA's Mong Tai Army in January 1996 was hailed by Rangoon as a major counternarcotics success, but lack of government will and ability to take on major narcotrafficking groups and lack of serious commitment against money laundering continues to |
| 2004 | world's second largest producer of illicit opium (potential production in 2003 - 484 metric tons, down 23% due to eradication efforts and alternate development; cultivation in 2003 - 47,130 hectares, a 39% decline from 2002); surrender of drug warlord KHUN SA's Mong Tai Army in January 1996 was hailed by Rangoon as a major counternarcotics success, but lack of government will and ability to take on major narcotrafficking groups and lack of serious commitment against money laundering continues to |
| 2005 | remains world's second largest producer of illicit opium (estimated production in 2004 - 292 metric tons, down 40% from 2003 due to eradication efforts and drought; cultivation in 2004 - 30,900 hectares, a 34% decline from 2003); lack of government will and ability to take on major narcotrafficking groups and lack of serious commitment against money laundering continues to hinder the overall antidrug effort; major source of methamphetamine and heroin for regional consumption; currently under Fin |
| 2006 | remains world's second largest producer of illicit opium (estimated production in 2004 - 292 metric tons, down 40% from 2003 due to eradication efforts and drought; cultivation in 2004 - 30,900 hectares, a 34% decline from 2003); lack of government will to take on major narcotrafficking groups and lack of serious commitment against money laundering continues to hinder the overall antidrug effort; major source of methamphetamine and heroin for regional consumption; currently under Financial Actio |
| 2007 | remains world's second largest producer of illicit opium with an estimated production in 2005 of 380 metric tons, up 13% from 2004 and cultivation in 2005 was 40,000 hectares, a 10% increase from 2004; the decline in opium production in the United Wa State Army's areas of greatest control was more than offset by increases in south and east Shan state; lack of government will to take on major narcotrafficking groups and lack of serious commitment against money laundering continues to hinder the o |
| 2008 | remains world's second-largest producer of illicit opium with an estimated production in 2008 of 340 metric tons, an increase of 26%, and cultivation in 2008 was 22,500 hectares, a 4% increase from 2007; production in the United Wa State Army's areas of greatest control remains low; Shan state is the source of 94% of poppy cultivation; lack of government will to take on major narcotrafficking groups and lack of serious commitment against money laundering continues to hinder the overall antidrug |
| 2009 | remains world's second largest producer of illicit opium with an estimated production in 2008 of 340 metric tons, an increase of 26%, and poppy cultivation in 2008 totaled 22,500 hectares, a 4% increase from 2007; production in the United Wa State Army's areas of greatest control remains low; Shan state is the source of 94% of Burma's poppy cultivation; lack of government will to take on major narcotrafficking groups and lack of serious commitment against money laundering continues to hinder the |
| 2010 | remains world's second largest producer of illicit opium with an estimated production in 2008 of 340 metric tons, an increase of 26%, and poppy cultivation in 2008 totaled 22,500 hectares, a 4% increase from 2007; production in the United Wa State Army's areas of greatest control remains low; Shan state is the source of 94% of Burma's poppy cultivation; lack of government will to take on major narcotrafficking groups and lack of serious commitment against money laundering continues to hinder the |
| 2011 | world's third largest producer of illicit opium with an estimated production in 2009 of 250 metric tons, a decrease of 27%, and poppy cultivation in 2009 totaled 17,000 hectares, a 24% decrease from 2008; production in the United Wa State Army's areas of greatest control remains low; Shan state is the source of 94.5% of Burma's poppy cultivation; lack of government will to take on major narcotrafficking groups and lack of serious commitment against money laundering continues to hinder the overal |
| 2012 | world's third largest producer of illicit opium with an estimated production in 2009 of 250 metric tons, a decrease of 27%, and poppy cultivation in 2009 totaled 17,000 hectares, a 24% decrease from 2008; production in the United Wa State Army's areas of greatest control remains low; Shan state is the source of 94.5% of Burma's poppy cultivation; lack of government will to take on major narcotrafficking groups and lack of serious commitment against money laundering continues to hinder the overal |
| 2013 | world's third largest producer of illicit opium with an estimated production in 2012 of 690 metric tons, an increase of 13% over 2011, and poppy cultivation in 2012 totaled 51,000 hectares, a 17% increase over 2011; production in the United Wa State Army's areas of greatest control remains low; Shan state is the source of 94.5% of Burma's poppy cultivation; lack of government will to take on major narcotrafficking groups and lack of serious commitment against money laundering continues to hinder |
| 2014 | world's third largest producer of illicit opium with an estimated production in 2012 of 690 metric tons, an increase of 13% over 2011, and poppy cultivation in 2012 totaled 51,000 hectares, a 17% increase over 2011; production in the United Wa State Army's areas of greatest control remains low; Shan state is the source of 94.5% of Burma's poppy cultivation; lack of government will to take on major narcotrafficking groups and lack of serious commitment against money laundering continues to hinder |
| 2015 | world's third largest producer of illicit opium with an estimated production in 2012 of 690 metric tons, an increase of 13% over 2011, and poppy cultivation in 2012 totaled 51,000 hectares, a 17% increase over 2011; production in the United Wa State Army's areas of greatest control remains low; Shan state is the source of 94.5% of Burma's poppy cultivation; lack of government will to take on major narcotrafficking groups and lack of serious commitment against money laundering continues to hinder |
| 2016 | world's third largest producer of illicit opium with an estimated production in 2012 of 690 metric tons, an increase of 13% over 2011, and poppy cultivation in 2012 totaled 51,000 hectares, a 17% increase over 2011; production in the United Wa State Army's areas of greatest control remains low; Shan state is the source of 94.5% of Burma's poppy cultivation; lack of government will to take on major narcotrafficking groups and lack of serious commitment against money laundering continues to hinder |
| 2017 | world's second largest producer of illicit opium with an estimated poppy cultivation totaling 55,500 hectares in 2015 and an estimated potential production of 647 mt of raw opium; Shan state is the source of 91% of Burma's poppy cultivation; lack of government will to take on major narcotrafficking groups and lack of serious commitment against money laundering continues to hinder the overall antidrug effort; major source of methamphetamine and heroin for regional consumption |
| 2018 | world's second largest producer of illicit opium with an estimated poppy cultivation totaling 55,500 hectares in 2015 and an estimated potential production of 647 mt of raw opium; Shan state is the source of 91% of Burma's poppy cultivation; lack of government will to take on major narcotrafficking groups and lack of serious commitment against money laundering continues to hinder the overall antidrug effort; major source of methamphetamine and heroin for regional consumption |
| 2019 | world's second largest producer of illicit opium with an estimated poppy cultivation totaling 41,000 hectares in 2017, a decrease of 25% from the last survey in 2015; Shan state is the source of 91% of Burma's poppy cultivation; lack of government will to take on major narcotrafficking groups and lack of serious commitment against money laundering continues to hinder the overall antidrug effort; Burma is one of the world’s largest producers of amphetamine-type stimulants, which are trafficked th |
| 2020 | world's second largest producer of illicit opium with an estimated poppy cultivation totaling 41,000 hectares in 2017, a decrease of 25% from the last survey in 2015; Shan state is the source of 91% of Burma's poppy cultivation; lack of government will to take on major narcotrafficking groups and lack of serious commitment against money laundering continues to hinder the overall antidrug effort; Burma is one of the world’s largest producers of amphetamine-type stimulants, which are trafficked th |
| 2021 | a major source of illicit methamphetamine and opiates; illicit import of precursor chemicals from China increased production and trafficking of synthetic drugs; second-largest opium poppy cultivator in Asia, with an estimated 20,200 hectares grown in 2019; Yaba, a tablet containing methamphetamine, caffeine, and other stimulants, is produced in Burma and trafficked regionally; ethnic armed groups (EAGs), military-affiliated militias, and transnational criminal organizations oversee billion dolla |
| 2022 | a major source of illicit methamphetamine and opiates; illicit import of precursor chemicals from China increased production and trafficking of synthetic drugs; second-largest opium poppy cultivator in Asia, with an estimated 20,200 hectares grown in 2019; Yaba, a tablet containing methamphetamine, caffeine, and other stimulants, is produced in Burma and trafficked regionally; ethnic armed organizations, military-affiliated militias, and transnational criminal organizations oversee billion dolla |
| 2023 | source of precursor or essential chemicals used in the production of illicit narcotics; narcotics produced in Burma trafficked throughout the region, with routes extending beyond Southeast Asia to Australia, New Zealand, and Japan; second-largest opium poppy cultivator in Asia with an estimated 40,100 hectares grown in 2022; not a major source or transit country for drugs entering the United States; domestic consumption of synthetic drug cocktails such as Happy Water and Wei Tiong (mixtures of d |
| 2024 | source of precursor or essential chemicals used in the production of illicit narcotics; narcotics produced in Burma trafficked throughout the region, with routes extending beyond Southeast Asia to Australia, New Zealand, and Japan; largest opium poppy cultivator globally with an estimated 47,100 hectares grown in 2023; not a major source or transit country for drugs entering the United States; domestic consumption of synthetic drug cocktails such as Yaba, Happy Water, and Wei Tiong (mixtures of |
| 2025 | USG identification: major illicit drug-producing and/or drug-transit country major precursor-chemical producer (2025) |